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ABSTRACT
A dialectic approach to social reality construction and reification is
presented to show the overlap between two current theoretical perspectives
—
systems theory and political theory—which have gained considerable acceptance
for OD practice. With the dialectic approach, emphasis is placed on how organi-
zations manage the conflict between forces maintaining such pre-theoretic
knowledge as organizational beliefs, languages, values, symbolism, ideologies,
traditions and myths, and forces supporting their change and adaptation .
Dialectic thinking shifts the focus in OD from strategies of harmony and
stability to strategies which enable organizations to deal more effectively
with the strain between the social structures produced by man and internalized
as reified "social facts." A general model is presented to explain the social
construction process, i.e., how actors differentiate their continuous flow of
experience into patterns of Intentions, Actions, Consequences, and Evaluations.
These "patterns" become the object of dialectic forces for their maintenance
and/or adaptation. To explore this process further, a typology of "myths" is
presented as one example of the social reality construction and reification
process. A number of exploratory applications are made to OD, including three
potential interventions into the myth making process.

Introduction
Systems theory and political theory are being called upon by organization
theorists to deal with the tendency to "reify" subjective abstractions, such
as roles and social structure, as concrete objects. Organizations are reified
when they are treated as "things" that dominate human action, rather than as
networks of "human" meanings created by human activity. The result of reifica-
tion for the practice of Organizational Development (OD) is to treat human
relations as object relations. Closely linked to the reification process is
the dialectic of man creating a society, which in turn controls him and which
he then redesigns only to be controlled once again. In like manner, man creates
an organization, then reifys it by detaching and forgetting about its subject-
ive creation. Ultimately, it dominates him. This focus on the relation of
the dialectic to reification allows us to focus on how subjective reality is
eventually treated as objective reality. (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Berger &
Pullberg, 1967)
It has been suggested that OD drop its human relations emphasis on truth
and love in favor of interpretations based on more rigorous behavioral science
principles (Bennis, 1969; French & Bell, 1973; Kahn, 1974), especially the
aspects of power and conflict imbedded in political theory (Pettigrew, 1975;
Tushman, 1977), and secondly the interconnectedness of subsystems (Huse, 1975)
as proposed by systems theory . We feel it important that OD be concerned with
an apparent area of overlap between these two perspectives. Both perspectives
are now paying increasing attention to the significant role that subjective
meaning plays in how actors create and become controlled by socially constructed
and reified reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). We believe that a conceptual
combination of the phenomenological aspects of subjective meaning and the

2tendency toward the dialectic of reification can be usefully applied to the
theory and practice of OD.
After outlining aspects of systems theory and political theory that are
beginning to come to grips with the role of subjective meaning in the dialectic
of social reality construction and reification, we will explore the application
of this intersection of conceptual thought to OD. We believe that one of the
benefits to OD of this newly derived perspective lies in its potential for
avoiding the possible reification of current OD theory and practice. As an
aspiring applied behavioral science, OD needs to resist the tendency to inap-
propriately apply the methods of an object-bound science (e.g., physics, biology),
which often in the interests of conforming to the assumptions of mathematical
modeling, reduces human relations to object relations and treats investigation
of subjective meaning and social reality as immaterial and undefinable.
While we agree with the criticisms of Kahn (1974) and others that OD needs
to become r.ore scientifically defined, less autobiographical, and needs sharper
boundaries of what it is and is not, we disagree with the proposal that OD limit
itself to changes in formal role patterns. In our opinion, too narrow a focus
on roles tends to objectify OD and defines as less important the notion that
roles are abstract conceptualizations, which, through reification, have become
detached from their human intentionality (Berger & Pullberg, 1967; Johenson,
1973). If we are to study roles, it should be from the perspective of how
actors define them and not from the perspective of imposed a priori definitions.
One way to take a closer look at social reality and its construction is to
consider one of its manifestations, "myth making." Later, we will propose a
general model of how actors interpret their flow of "spatial-temporal"
experience through, among other conventions, the use of myths. In addi-
tion, we will present a typology of myths that many authors have attributed
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myths which have either an important role in dealing with unknown cause and
effect relationships or which provide standards of desirability under condi-
tions of conflict. A number of exploratory applications will be made to OD,
including three potential interventions into the myth making aspects of social
reality construction.
Systems Theory and Political Theory
We turn now to systemically defining the perspective of dialectic social
reality construction and reification as it is applied to systems theory and
political theory. This will be accomplished by reviewing recent criticisms
of these theories.
Systems Theory
Pondy (1976) may well be regarded as among the first to suggest that
systems theory should extend itself by paying greater attention to the role
of man's ability to construct and to be controlled by his network of social
meanings. Man attributes meaning to events through the use of language and
by an awareness of his awareness. Here we begin to note the dialectic of man
as active creator of a social reality to which he later assigns the status of
objective materiality (i.e., social fact). (Pondy & Boje, 1976:4) It is
precisely this dialectic between the subjective social construction of reality
and its subsequent internalization as social fact that provides a useful exten-
sion to the contributions of both systems theory and political theory. Benson
(1977) has defined this dialectic as a conflict in which "the realities accepted
by participants at any particular time may be continuously undermined by on-
going acts of social construction. Even powerful actors may be unable to
maintain an orderly, rationalized system of social relatione in the face of
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process of construction, followed by the internalization of dehumanized reifica-
tion. It occurs simultaneously in various parts of social systems acting on
one another. The role of the dialectic and the importance of how actors define
situations will become more apparent in the following criticisms.
1. The important boundaries of systems are not obvious or predetermined
,
but are defined by its actors . This first criticism strikes at the very
foundation of systems theory. As originally developed by von Bertalanffy (1956),
a biologist, and more recently adapted for understanding social systems by Katz
and Kahn (1966) and Buckley (1967) and applied to OD by Huse (19 75) and
others, systems theory has been attacked for relying too heavily on its bio-
logical origins. This has resulted in a tendency to dehumanize social systems
to the more mechanistic, cause and effect laws of the biological and physical
sciences. It should be pointed out that von Bertalanffy strongly objected to
efforts which attempted to collapse what he saw as a search for underlying
order at several levels of reality (e.g., moral, social, cognitive, biological,
and physical) to order only at the physical level of reality.
Silverman (1971), Weick (1977), and Pondy (1977) have suggested that one
of the problems with systems theory applications to social organizations is
the imposition of arbitrary and rigid definitions of system boundaries.
Silverman (1971) suggests that Katz and Kuhn (1966), despite the many positive
contributions they have made to systems theory, have overused the organic
analogy to the point of losing the distinction between organization and
organism. This has resulted in overemphasizing the necessity for establishing
the boundaries of organizations, rather than understanding how actors them-
selves define the internal environment from the external environment. Focus-
ing in on actors' definitions of their internal and external environments is
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their definitions of what is environment and what is organization. "Instead
of adapting to a readymade environment .. .actors themselves create the environ-
ment to which they adapt." (p. 27) What we are suggesting is that a signi-
ficant part of the enactment process is dialectic and centered on how actors
cognitively define their boundaries. Berger and Pullberg (1967) have suggested,
for example, that social structure, once reified, narrows the horizons of what
is allowed by actors to make sense. (p. 65) Thompson (1967) has also suggested
that organizations, in their attempt to attain rationality, act to control
their internal operations and task environments to the greatest extent possi-
ble, but never achieve a totally closed rational system, (p. 27) That is,
systems enact "closed," rational interpretations of their social order in the
face of their "openness" to the input of disorder from their environments. A
system acts dialectically by closing itself off to the variety that maintains
it. In addition, the system undermines certain reified social realities in
favor of some ongoing social construction of change in order to achieve adapt-
ability. As Weick (1976) has stated, the system must somehow address the
(dialectic) question of adaptation precluding adaptability. Pondy (1976), in
a sense, completes the argument by suggesting that much of what we have been
labeling "open systems" is more correctly a blend of Boulding's (1968) open
system and control system perspectives. Attention to the dialectic and socially
constructed aspects of systems is a helpful way for understanding OD practice and
to note the linkage between the forces of rationality and reification and the
forces favoring change and adaptability.
2
. Systems are not tightly or loosely coupled , but are the product of con-
stantly negotiated conflict . Another result of the organic metaphor in
systems theory applications is to see social systems as tightly coupled,
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coupled aspects of social systems is that the positivistic aspects of the
methodologies being employed are better at describing underlying order than
disorder and uniqueness. (Benson, 1977). Viewing systems as loosely coupled
entities, according to Benson, has the consequence of focusing upon how the
social construction process is carried out in differentiated social contexts,
which produces multiple and incompatible forms, (p. 4) The social system, in
its loosely coupled aspects, produces contradictions in the form of ruptures,
inconsistencies, and incompatabilities that the ongoing process of social
construction attempts to bring under tighter control and integration (Benson,
1977; Weick, 1976; Lorsch & Lawrence, 1969). The tightly coupled aspects of
the system are registered through the application of positivistic methodologies
which let us see only the order of the system.
Order, however, is only half of the dialectic. The dialectic described
here is between the levels of autonomy and adaptability needed in the component
constructions and the need for integrating or tight coupling order on the part
of the system as a whole. This negotiation requires us to look at the second
perspective, the perspective that emerges from political theory.
Political Theory
The political dimension of organization can be seen in the interplay of
dialectic forces of individuals and interest groups, which originally supported
system change and adaptation, being transformed into favoring the maintenance
and stability of what they have created. At the heart of this issue is the
anticipated and actual impact change strategies will have on the power rela-
tionships among system actors (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Pettigrew, 1973, 1975).
Participative decision making, additional or new information linkages and
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have interests in maintaining the current order or are welcomed by those seek-
ing the redistribution of power. A number of authors (Bennis, 1969; Pettigrew,
1975; Tushmann, 1977) have argued that a major problem with many OD models is
the systematic avoidance of the political impact of change on levels of power
and conflict.
Besides this dialectic, an often overlooked aspect of politics is the
affect manipulations of socially constructed reality have on physical resource
and information networks. System change is bound to not only affect the
politics of resource patterns, but the symbols, languages, beliefs, traiditions,
ideologies, and myths that make up the "system of organizational meanings."
In this vien, politics can be viewed here as the translation of demands and
support into collective purpose and commitment through the creation, mainten-
ance, and overall management of meaning that constitutes social reality—while
at the same time avoiding long term repercussion. In short, it is the symbolic
mediation of demands and support, while not provoking counteraction that
threatens long term, personal interest.
1. A reductionist focus on the consequence of politics in resource
networks diverts attention away from the process of political action in net-
works of meaning . Discussions of politics often narrow down to an emphasis on
power outcomes, which in turn become translated into theories of antecedent
influence over substitutability and contrality in resource distribution networks.
One of the few attempts in the OD literature to apply even this level of reduc-
tion to the impact of OD interventions on the political aspects of change in
resource flows is that of Pettigrew (1975). He has suggested that consultants
need to base their strategies on a fuller antitipated awareness of their own
and their client's position in the organizational resource network. Pettigrew
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of power in terms of resource flows, but to the process of power whereby a focus
on the manipulation of meaning becomes Important. Consultants must identify and
anticipate "...what is salient for the client both in task and political terms,
so that proposals may be formulated to receive minimal client resistance and
maximal support from the locus of power in his organization." (p. 202) The
dialectic can be seen here in how political actors focus on long term counter-
acting forces not salient in short term consequences.
In his more recent work, Pettigrew (1976) has given greater attention to
the political processes which translate demands and support into collective
purpose and commitment. His interest in organizational cultures, which are
created by man and subsequently shape him, takes us beyond reductionism to
the inclusion of dialectic forces and to the importance of socially con-
struced reality manipulations in the negotiations between those forces. Easton
(1965) has noted that many political actions chiefly arouse and satisfy people,
not by granting or withholding substantive resource demands, but by changing
the meaning of their demands and expectations, (p. 7) Tushmann (1977) has
added to this argument by noting that political processes rely on adjustments
in norms, values, and even languages to handle uncertain information, diverse
goals, conflicting values, disagreements over cause and effect relations, and
numerous subjective issues that are open to multiple interpretation, (p. 210-
212) We can only conclude that resource networks affect and are affected by
socially constructed reality in a dialectic process.
2
.
Viewing actors from a. political perspective goes beyond looking solely
at the actor's response to "objective" stimulus to including how actors employ
"sense making" to define stimulus / response linkages . Pondy (1975) has suggested
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explain and give order to past, present, and future collective experience.
Leaders, who have the capacity to go public with sense making attempts that
followers can grasp with new meaning, can gain leverage beyond actual resource
control. As noted by Pondy, "The real power of Martin Luther King was not only
that he had a dream but that he could describe it, that it became public, and
therefore accessible to millions of people." (p. 11)
Recognizing language as a power source allows us to discuss the use of
symbolism and metaphors in aiding people to transform a loosely coupled,
chaotic, and ambiguous world into a more ordered social reality they can ac-
cept. Weick (1976) has suggested that "...under conditions of loose coupling
one should see considerable effort devoted to constructing social reality, a
great amount of face work and linguistic work, numerous myths... and in gen-
eral one should find a considerable amount of effort being devoted to punctuat-
ing this loosely coupled world and connecting it in some way in which it can be
made sensible." (p. 13) Once again, we see the importance of looking at how
actors themselves attempt to create and maintain a more rational system, which
they subsequently reify as "social fact." Politicians have long been recognized
for their ability to take followers' misgivings about ambiguity and symboli-
cally redirecting their attentions toward strategies which will purportedly
resolve their dilemma (Edelman, 1964, 1971). Clearly, one of the ways OD can
impact on the political aspects of social reality construction and reification
is to study and attempt to make better sense of the sense making attempts of
organizational actors.
Relative to this argument, one of the important facets of sense making
and influence in political settings is the politician's reification of sub-
jective experience. Coser (1956) has depicted how politicians act to define
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in-groups and out-groups by labeling certain groups as menacing enemies.
Edelman (1971) has pointed out how Hitler was able to define Jews as a
threat to the social order he sought to create. Reification allows the
transformation of subjective values into legitimizers for intended action
and retrospective rationalizers of intended or unintended consequences.
Sense making is an important aspect of the political processes for the
creation, maintenance, and transformation of social reality into resource
advantage.
Overlap of Systems Theory and Political Theory; OP Applications
Rather than begin anew to rediscover the linkages between systems
theory and political theory, 0D can look to some work already begun by sev-
eral political theorists (e.g., Deutsch, 1963; Easton, 1965; Davies & Lewis,
1971; Weinstein, 1971). The integration of these perspectives can be termed
"political systems" theory. One area of overlap, for example, can be seen
in the work of Deutsch (1963), who has noted that political systems theory
has been too eager to adopt the "myth of the system-wide equilibrium."
From the political perspective, this can be seen in the actions of
statesmen attempting to restore some classical image of the "balance of
power." (p. 196) It can also be seen in the "myth of the stable state."
(Schon, 1975) Organizations, rather than being viewed as negotiating a
continuous dialectic, are looked upon by many OD practitioners as in
need of being unfrozen, moved, and refrozen. This metaphor of organizations
as "ice cubes" implies a belief in the existence of a stable state at the time
the OD interventionist enters the system to engage in unfreezing and again when
he leaves the system in a refrozen stable state. Change is accomplished by
repositioning water molecules (actors) in organic space. Such an emphasis is
biased toward the stability and maintenance component of the dialectic and
aiding the system to achieve greater rationality and control. It does not
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note, it seems, those forces seeking to modify reified reality. In other
words, this misplaced concreteness directs attention away from efforts that
would enable the system to cope with its needs for change and adaptability
in the face of a simultaneous need for maintenance of a reified pattern of
socially constructed reality.
The dialectic approach to understanding reality is fundamentally dif-
ferent from OD applications based on Lewin's (1947) driving and restraining
forces for adjusting quasi-stationary equilibriums. Force field theory
directs attention away from how change comes into conflict with itself , i.e. ,
change is seen as a_ series of harmonious adjustments between opposing forces
rather than as the continuous process of the result of social change acting
back to constrain subsequent change possibilities . This can be seen clearly
in what Mills (1962) has termed has the "laws of the Dialectic."
1. Ii things change enough, they become different, qualitatively,
1
from what they were to begin with (i.e., the field itself changes).
2. One thing grows out of another and then comes into conflict with
it (i.e., driving and restraining forces are linked together in time).
3. History thus proceeds by a series of conflicts and resolutions rather
than merely by minute and gradual changes (i.e., greater emphasis is
placed on recurring conflicts than stable states)
.
There is yet another factor to be considered here. Organizational actors
must cope with the mysteries which prevade their attempts to achieve the ever
elusive rational and stable organization. There are contradictions, incon-
sistencies, rifts, and gaps in their social fabric. The behavioral sciences
have not provided adequate means for coping with them. With but few exceptions,
the behavioral sciences have been more concerned with theories of underlying
order than of disorder (Mitroff & Kilmann, 1977; Clark, 1972; Benson, 1977).
One of the coping mechanisms undefined in force field theory is "myth-
making." What we hope to add in this discussion is an emphasis on the actor's
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own meaning systems for making sense of his flow of experience. People pos-
sess their own "lay theories" or myths about the world around them, which,
right or wrong, affect their behavior.
Myths and OP
We would like to use the term "myth" to represent a broad category of
phenomena, rather than the typical notion of a story or saga of prior events,
usually assumed to be of questionable truth when compared to rigorous scien-
tific evidence.
According to Mitroff and Kilmann (1975) , science itself can be viewed as
a form of "myth making." Kuhn (1962) describes the relationship between myth
and science as follows:
"The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics,
philogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more
certain they feel that those once current views of nature
were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the pro-
duct of human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If
these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths
,
then myths
can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the
same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge."
(p. 2, italics ours)
Myths are more than just erroneous beliefs or superstitions about the world
and man's relation to it that are clung to despite contrary evidence. The
assumed scientific truth of today can become the myth of tommorrow.
For our purposes, we are particularly interested in myths that are used
to explain cause and effect relationships under conditions of incomplete
knowledge, and those that help define standards of desirability under condi-
tions of conflict. Pettigrew (1976), building on Cohen (1969), has suggested
that myths are tied to political processes in that they justify and sustain the
values underlying political interests, explain contradictions between pro-
fessed valued and actual behavior, and legitimate established systems in the
face of environmental threats, (p. 18) It is these and other uses of myths
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that allows us to explore the role of meaning in political systems perspectives.
In short, we view myths as socially constructed conceptual filters for
classifying and giving meaning to some aspects of experience, while defining
other aspects as less important and as recipes that posit rules for conduct
and decision making. As such, myths have both political and system uses. We
are less concerned with the factual content of myths than with their impact on
behavior. As Thomas (1928) has suggested, "If men define situations as real,
they are real in their consequences."
Myths in OP
There is some disagreement among OD theorists as to the role of myth mak-
ing in OD. Margulies (1972) has described OD as somewhere between a discipline
applying the principles of the behavioral sciences and a magical shannon employ-
ing such devices as placebos and myths to effect change. He specifies several
myths that OD practitioners have used to initiate, sustain, and transform or-
ganizational change efforts into organizational outputs. Vaill (1974) has pro-
vided a similar set of myths in his discussion of "practice theories" used by
OD practitioners.
French and Bell (1973), on the other hand, have emphasized the need to
"demythologize" OD by focusing on the application of scientific principles from
such fields as social psychology, social anthropology, psychiatry, economics,
and political science. According to French and Bell, "...practitioners base
their diagnoses and actions on the known lawful-patterned events and dynamics
that help explain individual, group and organizational behavior." (p. 47)
It is our contention that many organizational events as yet lack specif-
able "lawful patterns " and are chaotic enough to be termed "mysteries." While
OD does and indeed should continue to apply behavioral science knowledge in
ongoing systems, a significant part of OD practice achieves change through the
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advancement of myths about OD and by intervening in the myths employed by
clients. The purpose of this paper, of course, is not to negate the value of
OD and client myths or to suggest that they are dysfunctional—we merely wish
to better understand the political process of myth making in social systems.
The I-A-C-E Model and OD
We propose next a sense making model for describing the linkage between
Intentions, Actions, Consequences, and Evaluations (hereafter I, A, C, E) as
a way of capturing the dialectic process of social reality construction and
reification. Intentions are usually associated with such terms as goals,
visions, objectives, anticipations, plans, and expectations that reflect, at-
tempt to control, and make better sense of future events. Actions are be-
haviors exhibited by actors. Consequences are the effects, outcomes, or
responses that stem from actual, perceived, or anticipated actions. Evalua-
tions describe post hoc (retrospective) rationalizations, reconstructions,
justifications, and value judgments. IACEs are linked together in varying
combinations to form pre-theoretic patterns that enable actors to make sense
of their continuous "spaciotemporal" experience. This is thought to be ac-
complished in a two-phase process of differentiating continuous experience
into various IACE combinations and establishing patterns of connections be-
tween these differentiated events.
IACEs fit into our earlier discussion of the social construction and
reification of reality as the products of that process. IACEs are patterns
that are simultaneously constructed, reified, maintained, and legitimized;
they are the subject of socialization, adaptation or revolution, and recon-
struction. A single actor may experience any pattern of IACEs sequentially ,
2
but multiple actors in multiple settings enact them simultaneously .
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A major point to be made is that actors' myths about their world, whether
you refer to them as ideologies, cultural belief systems, philosophies, or
lay theories, legitimize intentions (before) and rationalize evaluations
(after) to allow the pursuit of some As and Cs in place of others . If an
actor can systematically influence another actor's social construction of
reality, in a manner that results in resource advantage, power has been
wielded. (Pettigrew, 1975). Writers, such as Marx and Weber, have long
noted that myths which take hold of the masses have played an historical
role in justifying economic interests. (Gerth & Mills, 1948: 61).
A General Model
The general model we are proposing builds on the work of Deutsch (1963)
,
Pondy (1975), Salancik (1976), and Weick (1969, 1976). 3 Below, we attempt to
show Intentions, Actions, Consequences, and Evaluations (IACE) as differentiated
and abstracted elements from the continuous flow of experience in time and
space.
While we by no means imply that sense making is involved in every OD
intervention, we feel that many interventions are concerned with helping
system actors to make better or often alternative sense of their experience.
Level III: Secondary
Patterns
Level II: Primary
•r
i
1
4-Differentiated
Events i«
Level I: Continuous
"Spaciotemporal"
Experience
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"Spacio temporal" experience (Level I) is eventually patterned by an actor into
various IACE combinations (Level III) in order to make sense of that flow. The
flow is differentiated by applying categories or dimensions that attempt to
capture aspects of the continuity which can be mapped as patterns. A pattern
can be any logic, calculus, game, model, or myth (Deutsch, 1963) that defines
or creates IACE relations.
While the flow of experience for an actor is continuous in time and space,
his contacts with other actors can be better characterized as discontinuous.
Brief encounters with other actors from time to time in different situations
are the inputs available to him for forming various pictures about them.
The actor might, for example, see another person's actions, and even feel
the consequences of those actions, but be left with the task of reconstructing
that person's intentions or arriving at a post hoc evaluation of differentiated
As and Cs. In fact, given any three of these four events, a remembered pattern
can be used to fill in the fourth. One cannot assume that the pattern is
right or wrong unless one presumes to know the true underlying order it attempts
to portray. Many patterns of IACE create cognitive cause and effect relation-
ships and standards for action. According to Bilmes (1976), actors differ-
entiate and pattern events not only in terms of strict cause and effect rela-
tionships, but in terms of probabilities.
If, when we learn that event A has occurred, we are enabled
to say something about the past, present, or future occur-
rences of event B with an increased probability of being
correct, then we have a departure from randomness
—
pattern-
ing is present, (p. 51)
In our opinion, myths are sense-making devices for interpreting loosely
coupled "primary events." These patterns may serve either as a guide for
further action or an interpretation of what has occurred. They are used in
political contexts to allow actors to assume tighter "closed" connections
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between events than may otherwise be possible. We have shown four components
as inputs to the sense making process. By contrast, much of the biological /
physical systems theory has been concerned only with the connection between
A and C and has paid little attention to 1 and 32. In addition, little has been
said about the relationship between primary differentiated events and second-
ary patterns.
In summary, actors in social/political systems experience a continuous
flow of primary events (IACEs) concerning which they must make, and often
create, sense. They are faced with multiple I's, A's, C's, and E's from which
they select certain sets to form secondary patterns that superimpose order to
their chaotic flow of experience. Patterns are seen as frameworks for process-
ing information and are stored as symbols by means of quasi-permanent changes
in an appropriate medium, such as electrical circuits in computers, cells in
nerve/brain tissue, or written marks on pieces of paper. Consider, for illustra-
tive purposes, the case of multiple actors in a social system. The first actor
(e.g., manager) has an intention (I.) for an action (A ) he would like to see
performed by a second actor (e.g., a subordinate), although he may not be cer-
tain about which of several actions (A.,... A ) will result. Further, a third
l n
actor may experience the consequences of the second actor's action. Finally,
still another actor may have the task of assigning one of many evaluations
(E.....E ) to the I's, A's, and C's he experiences.
h A l C l E l
I
2
A
2
C
2
E
2
Unpatterned Level II
primary events
I A C E.
n n n 1
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It seems to us that when people are asked, "Why did you... or why won't
you try this?" that people's evaluations of such questions are very fragile
affairs. They respond with, "Because the rules prohibit it," or "Because the
law says it should happen this way," or "Because this will go wrong," or "Because
that will occur," and so forth. When pressed further, these attempts at evalua-
tion are often found to rest on assumptions which have no correlate in "objective
reality." That is, people are able to rationalize intuitive judgments by inven-
tion of "social facts." When passed to others, who accept then as valid, these
evaluations combine to constitute the reified reality (A or C) of social
structure. Actor A initially accepts his conjecture as construction of subject-
ive reality, but Actor B internalizes it more concretely and passes it on to
Actor C as cause and effect.
In our opinion, it is the loosely coupled nature of intentions (I)
,
Actions (A), Consequences (C) , and Evaluations (E) in social systems which
breeds the ambiguity and mystery that encourages and even necessitates the
emergence and maintenance of mythology. From this perspective, OD consultants
and other actors can be described as activators and modifiers of complex cogni-
tive patterns which permit attitudes and behaviors to reform in ways that bring
important adjustments in both physical (e.g., resource allocation) and social
(e.g., interpersonal influence) reality. Salancik (1975) has provided support
for this position in describing how an actor's intentions are often loosely
coupled with his actions. Especially in the case of ambiguity, an actor is
often forced to couple his intentions to his actions after the actions have
taken place. This process of self-justification (or evaluation) often occurs
in organizational settings.
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During extremely unfavorable years, company presidents
tell their stockholders that adverse economic conditions
created the problem. During favorable years, they tell
their stockholders that the company's investments in
research and development and joint ventures are having
the intended effect. (p. 13)
Similarly, March (1976) has pointed out that "...human choice behavior is at least
as much a process for discovering goals as for acting on them." (p. 72)
Anthropologists, like Harris (1974), have highlighted the dialectic by noting
that "...it is likely that actions determine thoughts at least as often as thoughts
determine action, that behavior is a guide for 'culture' at least as often as
'culture* is a guide for behavior." (p. 248) Further, Pondy (1975) has suggested
that actors cognitively model the "outside" world as an image or definition of
the situation and that actions are planned and selected with this image in
mind. (p. 7)
These and other examples suggest that actions and consequences can be
either intention-directed or retrospectively made sensible to actors through
the use of myths. Actors attempt to make sense of what will be, as well as
what has occurred. In the loosely coupled reality of temporal events, as
Hume (1955) has stated, "...there are only temporal cause effect connections
between events in the mind." Viewing action and consequences as only inten-
tional tends to overlook the role of random and retrospectively reconstructed
activity. (Weick, 1969)
Alternate Models
A goal model and a retrospective model of IACE are presented below. In
accordance with the goal model, actions are always the result of intentions and
followed by consequences. Every A-C must be the result of a conscious or
latent I. An alternative is the retrospective model, where actions are often
the result of unknown evolutionary or random forces and you cannot predict
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A and C without experience. From a dialectic view, both models are related.
The difference is that the goal model begins the sequence with I, while the
retrospective model begins with A.
Goal Model Retrospective Model
I—* A—} C—* E A—- C~y E--> I/K
- /v
There, of course, could be other orderings of IACE. Consider the case of
the self fulfilling prophecy (IEAC) . Actors develop an I or expectation that
is sought out, evaluated, and acted upon (A). The consequences (C) are dis-
covered in experience to provide confirmation to the initial intention. For
Weick (1977), this (dialectic) process can be seen when actors enact an environ-
ment which they attempt to make sense of, and which eventually leads to self-
confirming consequences. Weick 's cited case of Polaroid stock is an excellent
example.
Doubts concerning the attractiveness of the Polaroid
investments created the environment which then was
imposed on investors and made Polaroid stocks less
attractive to hold, thereby validating the initial
definition that they might be less attractive than
originally thought— a self-fulfilling prophecy,
(p. 269)
According to Rottenberg (1968), the result of this process was institutions
selling ever larger blocks of Polaroid stock until the price dropped from a
1972 level of $86 a share to $15 a share in 1975. (pp. 221-2)
In the case of an AECI combination, one actor's A is evaluated by another
actor in a way that produces consequences that would not have otherwise
followed the action, leading to intentions for subsequent actions. At first
glance it might appear that A should always be directly followed by C. We
suggest that it is always possible that an I or E can intercede to moderate
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the relationship between A and C, especially where actors adopt nonverif iable
myths about A-C connections. In short, if we assume a relationship between two
or more actors, any combination of IACEs in any sequence is plausible.
An Illustration : Management by Objectives . Noting the potential relation-
ship between the goal and retrospective models of IACE can provide useful
theoretical impacts toward understanding a variety of OD interventions. This
illustration deals specifically with Management by Objectives (MBO). In MBO,
action choices are often assumed to be the result of pre-existing objectives.
March (1976), on the other hand, has applied the retrospective model to such
an assumption. March states, "It seems to me perfectly obvious that a descrip-
tion that assumes goals come first and action comes later is frequently radically
wrong." (p. 72) If this is the case, it seems we could improve the function-
ing of MBO in organizations by placing more emphasis on ways to discover object-
ives and ways to legitimize more trial and error actions when the achievement
of a given objective cannot be predicted.
A second extension can be made to the practice of MBO by noting that A's
and C's often do not match the predictions and guidelines of objectives (I's).
Yet, if we assume a goal-dominated model, we are inclined to modify A's and
C's to conform to reified objectives, rather than modifying objectives retro-
spectively on the basis of subsequent and unanticipated action possibilities.
In other words, our socially constructed reality of planned objectives may
become so reified that they take priority over the IACEs that are being
organized.
Evaluation becomes of interest within a program of MBO when one realizes
that objectives allow people to answer the question of "Why are you doing what
you are doing?" They are legitimizers and maintainors of action. Often the
evaluations of pre-stated objectives can be viewed as a useful way to obtain
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feedback on the differences between objectives and unanticipated results, pro-
viding we allow the possible occurrence of a deviation. Here, feedback itself
may be considered as the antithesis acting back upon the reified thesis.
Combined/Alternate Models
Before we get carried away with replacing the goal model with the retro-
spective model, we would like to suggest that attempts to rationalize and pre-
dict one's intended actions and consequences before the fact is a fundamental
part of the organizing process. Instead of arguing in favor of one model over
the other, we need to integrate the two models, recognizing that objectives
become recipes for future actions, but that many objectives are discoveries
rather than inventions. We turn now to a typology of myths of practitioners
and system actors and to potential interventions in the myth making process.
Toward the end of this paper we will point out how to bypass the IACE differ-
entiation and patterning process through the use of "Zen."
A Typology of Myths and Myth Making Interventions
To show the application of myth making to OD, we have included a typology
(Table 1) that displays an incomplete listing of myths used by OD practitioners
and clients. In each case, we have indicated the author who is best known to
us for explicating that particular myth. We must qualify our list of myths by
pointing out that several of the myths were never explicitly stated by the
authors and we took great liberty in reading between the lines. In some cases,
myth statements were reversed to lend emphasis. As much as possible, we have
attempted to convey the author's original meaning. This highlights an important
problem with the literature concerning myths. Much of it talks about myth
making without providing concrete examples of the myths being talked about
(notable exceptions are Mintzberg, 1975; Margulies, 1972; Mitroff & Kilmann,
1976).
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A Typology of Myths Used by OP Practitioners and Organizational Actors
While any classification is in some sense arbitrary, we found it benefi-
cial to categorize myths according to their uses. To reiterate, we are less
concerned with the factual quality of myths or in debates over differences
between scientific principles that are outdated and myths—instead we prefer
to focus on how myths are filters for making sense, i.e., of constructing and
anticipating one's flow of experience and as recipes for action. Within this
perspective, a review of the literature revealed the following general typology.
Myths Concerning 1. Myths that create, maintain, and legitimize
Standards of past, present, or future actions and consequences.
Desirability
2. Myths that maintain and conceal political interest*
and value systems.
Myths Concerning 3. Myths that help explain and even create cause
Cause and Effect and effect relationships under conditions of
Relationships incomplete knowledge.
4. Myths that rationalize away the complexity and
turbulence of events to allow for sense making
and predictable action taking.
This typology builds on the Thompson (1967) framework and categories myths in
accordance with whether they deal with standards of desirability (1 and 2) or
with cause and effect relationships (3 and 4) . We feel myth making will be
most prevalent in organizations where relations of cause and effect and stand-
ards of desirability are unknown or in dispute. In this typology, I and E
relate to standards of desirability and A and C to cause and effect rela-
tionships.
InsertJTable 1 About Here
In Table 1, we have categorized myths cited by OD practitioners (as well
as theorists) in one column and myths attributed to organizational actors in
the other. (The latter refers to myths that have been attributed to people
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who work and live in organizations, not just to OD clients.) In several
instances, we found myths that served dual purposes and therefore could be
placed in more than one row or column.
It is interesting that many of the myths attributed to clients are also
analogous to myths attributed to practitioners. This may reflect the applied
nature of OD. Perhaps practitioners are coopted by the myths of client systems
or practitioners employ client system myths as a means of entering, surviving,
and effecting change. These and similar questions await further research into
the use of myths by agents of system change and system actors.
1. Myths that create, maintain, and legitimize past, present, and future
actions and consequences . Margulies (1972) has pointed out how the "myth of new-
ness" and the "myth of OD being based on rational scientific principles" (item 4b)
can add the legitimacy needed to obtain entrance into the client system and the
support of influentials once inside. War stories (Mitroff & Kilmann, 1976) can also
be used by both practitioner and actor to legitimize the continuance of techniques
that worked well in the past.
From a dialectic view, besides anchoring the past to the present and pro-
viding legitimacy, myths can be important creators of organizational futures.
Clark (1972) and Pettigrew (1976) have reported how entrepeneurs and reformers
at times push aside the old structure in favor of the image of the potentialities
of the future they intend to create. Sproull and Weiner (1976) have documented
how just such a process was of prime importance to the creation of the National
Institute of Education. Cognitive images of the future are molded and shaped
in ways that allow the mobilization of support and the legitimizing of policy
statements. People involved in myth-building also aid this process by adding
their prestige and reputation to the myth, which then, in turn, attains greater
concrete reality.
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King (1974) has described how "expectation effects" explain the results
of many OD efforts. One group of clients, for example, was told their inter-
vention would lead to greater productivity, while the other group was told that
greater improvements in interpersonal relationships would result. Controlling
for the expectation effects versus the type of intervention strategy employed,
he found that the expectations set up before the change strategy predicted its
outcome. Myths about the temporal past and future can be functional in their
ability to mobilize support and to provide protection against threats. They
can be dysfunctional when the prescriptions of the myth do not do justice to
the needs of reality. Margulies (1972) has reported how the myth of nonre-
searchable variables in OD has impeded evaluation efforts.
2 . Myths that maintain and conceal political interests and value systems .
OD efforts are open to being coopted, misdirected, and short-fused when they
threaten political interests and are not otherwise able to mobilize political
support.
A number of political interests can be hidden by myths, to the detriment
of system actors. Baritz (1960) has noted how many of the efforts of applied
behavioral scientists (not just OD practitioners) are used by organizations
to effect increased advantage over others. Hidden agendas on the part of
clients can be seen in their disguised efforts to obtain access to valued
information, to institute a program in order to accomplish head-chopping, or
to legitimize the failing activities of the institution. Once the hidden pur-
pose is achieved, support for the intervention or program is often withdrawn.
Ryan (1972) has provided a classic example of how institutions often blame
the poor and disadvantaged for the inequities wrought by those institutions.
Pfeffer (1977) has described how myths can be used by a few elite actors in or-
ganizations to camouflage their powers, make decisions in secret, hide the results
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of chose decisions, and provide the illusion of participation.
3 . Myths that help explain and even create cause and effect relation-
ships under conditions of incomplete knowledge . We have already mentioned
how many change efforts seem to assume that organizations are like ice cuhes.
The attempt to make organizations more organic than they are relates to our
earlier discussion concerning the role of reified social constructions of re-
ality in systems theory. This same myth of interconnectedness has been widely
noted. Weick (1976) has employed the term "loosely coupled systems" to empha-
size how actors often incorrectly assume tight linkages between system components
in educational organizations.
Simon (1976) has suggested that there are some organizational myths
about cause and effect that need serious consideration. One is that
authoritarianism is a denial of participation and a threat to self-actuali-
zation. He believes we may have overstated this argument to the point, of
overlooking how authority acceptance provides actors with necessary struc-
ture and environmental cues to allow greater creativity. Self actualization,
he proposes by contrast, is brought about by striking a balance between
freedom and constraint (p. 98). Secondly, Simon suggests that we need to
judge organizations by more than just how much participation is allowed.
He notes that such a perspective does not provide for an adequate treatment
of power relations (p. 1.00).
A case of myth conflict over cause and effect relationships has been re-
ported by Miller (1955). In colonial America, Europeans attempted to impose
their myth about the vertical (top-down) flow of authority on a tribe of
Algonkian Indians, whose own myth defined authority as being more decentralized
and available to those who possessed the generalized religious power of "Manitu."
The Europeans were unsuccessful at making soldiers out of Algonkians because
their myth allowed each Indian direct access to authority. Barnard (1939) has
described how a similar myth concerning vertical authority is maintained in

27
corporate settings to allow the matter of order-giving and order-taking to be
treated more impersonally, thereby reducing loss of status from compliance and
personal responsibility for the outcomes of such compliance (p. 170-1)
.
4 . Myths that rationalize away complexity and turbulence to allow sense
making and predictable action taking . Myths of this type play an important
role in providing the illusion of rational intention and action and in creat-
ing predictability in the face of random and evolutionary forces. Many actors
are disposed in organizational settings to see every action as the result of
an a priori goal. Every effect must have causal intention. Even if an action
is unintended, many refer to "latent" goals that produced the action. Evalua-
tion can hardly be assumed to be intentional in its trial and error process
of selective adaptation. On the other hand, many actions in organizations are
molded and guided by rational purpose to improve predictability of one's own,
as well as another's, actions.
Greenfield (1973) has indicated that practitioners may be making a mythical
assumption in treating organizations as identifiable, measurable, analyzable,
and changeable. Socially constructed reality affects the actions and conse-
quences of system actors. Margulies's (1972) myth about the rationa], scienti-
fically-based actions of practitioners suggests that many OD interventions
involve adaptation of strategies to unforeseen contingencies. Margulies pro-
poses that we consider OD as more of an art or craft than as a rational science.
A number of myths are directed toward simplifying the complexity of the
flow of events by resorting to ethical codes (Emery & Trist, 1965) and rules
(Harris, 19 74) that prescribe appropriate and inappropriate action. Rather
than respond to the turbulence of the environment directly, organizations often
enact a simpler environment of rules and laws for reaching their decisions.
Such prescriptions support the belief that there is no randomness in
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organizational action (Weick, 19 77; March & Olson, 19 76) and that decisions
are made on the basis of "hard" data and reflective and systematic planning
(Mintzberg, 1975). Mintzberg has noted that many managers mythically adopt
the planning, organizing, controlling, and coordinating model of management,
when in fact they make decisions in haste, live in a quick-paced, high-inter-
ruption environment and are busier responding than planning. We turn now to
ways of dealing with the myth making process.
Myth Making Intervention
In this section, we would like to propose three possible interventions
into the myth making process of organizations. Our discussion here is tenta-
tive and meant to be more exploratory than prescriptive.
1. Myth Transpection. An initial assumption is that
} if we dig deep
enough into the relationships between actors in complex organizations, a signi-
ficant part of those relationships will be based upon myths. Interventions
focusing upon allowing one actor to be able to see through the filters employed
by other actors may help to improve communication and understanding in social
systems. In describing ways to increase communication between paradigms,
Pondy and Boje (1976) have suggested the application of Maruyama's (1974)
strategy of de-monopolization and transpection.
Actors that believe in a single best way to view what is going on around
them may be quite unwilling to accept the fact that there can be several co-
existing social constructions of reality (i.e., myths). Believers in
one truth, one God, one right theory, according to Maruyama (1974), will need
to be persuaded in the existence of different logic systems and filters for
viewing situations. Here, de-monopolarization asks system actors to be able
to identify different organizational myths. The second step is "transpection"
where the actor attempts to "bracket" his own way of thinking and actually
think in terms of the myths held by other actors, so that he can see the same
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reality others are seeing, and thereby have the same sense of subjective
experience.
The most important step in the transpection process is being able to have
Actor A (having understood and been able to see with the filter used by Actor
B) explain to Actor B just how he sees B's world. OD practitioners employ
similar interventions when they ask clients to engage in imaging. In the
imaging process, clients are asked to describe how the other actor sees them.
This requires that Maruyama's three-step process be followed:
1. Recognizing differing social constructions, 2. Being able to see the
world the way the other sees it, 3. Being able to communicate what is seen
in the categories and patterns of his original filter before transpection.
2. Demythologizing
.
French and Bell (1973) have suggested that OD should
concern Itself more with applying behavioral science principles to its inter-
vention strategies. We need, in other words, to train system actors to rely
more on known lawful patterns of scientific findings that can be applied to
their settings. If this is the case, then the suggested intervention is
the substitution of the lawful patterns of the behavioral sciences for the
myth-patterns of clients. In accordance with this notion, OD practitioners
should spend more time training system actors in the principles of the beha-
vioral sciences and be more skillful at diagnosing and counteracting common
myths. Re-reification, unfortunately, would probably be a by-product of such
an application. Further, we wonder if the behavioral sciences have advanced
to the point of being able to confidently advocate their truth over that of
the people who work and live in organizations. Does it provide better tools
that will allow actors to enact better realities?
3. Myth Symmetry . Transpection and demythologizing may not be enough
to cause adjustments in firmly held patterns of belief about cause effect
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relationships and standards of desirability. Perhaps the intervention to
employ is to balance off clients' and practitioners' myths and incorporate
a more symmetrical view of reality.
If the relevant myths suggest a rationalized goal perspective, we might
temper this perspective with a greater emphasis on the use of problem and
goal discovery and retrospective sense making. On the other hand, suppose
actors presume that there is little they can do to counteract the unpredict-
ability and instability in their environments. Perhaps a greater emphasis,
then, on planning and goal setting models for actions would help participants
gain greater control over their environments.
In myth symmetry, the focus is not on shattering people's deep felt myths,
but in providing them with a balanced way of thinking about their flow of
experience.
Regarding preferences concerning beliefs, it becomes difficult to
argue for adjustments solely from a truth perspective. Symmetry allows for
absorption of client beliefs by way of modification rather than rejection.
From a political perspective, symmetry avoids much of the counteraction
potential brought on by fears of future adjustments in power bases.
Bypassing Myth Making with Zen
Thus far we have looked at processes whereby actors differentiate their
continuous flow of experience into partitioned events (IACE) and then pattern
them into causal and other relationships. Zen proposes a way to look at by-
passing the differentiation-patterning process; that is, to put actors in
more direct contact with their flow of experience.
Phenomenologists refer to a process of "bracketing" one's own logic system
in order to experience the flow of experience in an unbiased way. This is a
fundamental aspect of the second step in transpection referred to earlier.
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Similarly, Zen Buddhism refers to a way of breaking down one's filtering
mechanisms so the flow of experience can be directly felt.
In Zen, actors attempt to recapture the oneness that was natural to them
as a child, while preserving the intellectual power they developed as an adult.
It is assumed that the art of Zen cannot be communicated directly; its followers
must address a series of riddles that are net decipherable by Western logic.
One intervention this suggests is to have actors in organizations trade jobs
so they can feel the world the other feels. Suppose managers and subordi-
nates switched jobs for a day sc that each could not only see but feel and
understand the other's world.
Alternatively, it is an increasingly common practice in organizations to
rotate aspiring managers through positions in a variety of departments. This
enables them to internalize the languages, values, and belief systems of each
department.
In the process of differentiation and patterning, we mutiliate much of
the continuity and therefore the contents of the flow of experience. Zen
allows a potential way for us to deal with experiences that are not understand-
able by categorization. This is a phenomenon to which Pirsig applies the
Japanese term "mu." "Mu" is a phenomenon (riddle) that cannot be understood
in yes-no questions or either-or hypotheses.
A very strong case can be made for the statement that
science grows by its mu answers more than its yes or
no answers. Yes or no confirms or denies a hypothesis.
Mu says the answer is beyond the hypothesis. Mu is the
"phenomenon" that inspires scientific inquiry in the
first place! There's nothing mysterious or esoteric
about it. It's just that our culture has warped us
to make a low value judgment of it. (p. 315)
The question here is, are there aspects to OD and to the social construction
of reality by organizational actors that are not reduceable to a hypothesis
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format
—
mysteries to which the technology of the behavioral sciences has not
begun to cope? Perhaps OD copes better with the "mu" nature of organizational
experience through such actions as myth making than we realize.
Conclusions
Given the loosely coupled nature of many aspects of organizational settings,
myth making provides actors with a way of coping with the uncertainties of
complexity, instability, and rapid change. In complex systems, one is often
left with the task of inferring from too little information the appropriate
IACE connections to be made. Myth making can provide one way to make those
connections; behavioral science prescriptions provide another.
If the behavioral sciences are still evolving their respective disci-
plines—if their paradigms are in revolution, then we might assume that there
are yet unresolved and perhaps unexplored mysteries in organizational settings
that are currently being coped with through the application of myths. Inves-
tigating the myth making process provides us with a rich source of data to
learn how actors negotiate that which they do not yet understand. With but
few exceptions, we have not begun to tap these data. Yet, myths are believed
and they do guide, prescribe, and create behaviors at least as often as rigor-
ous truth. Actors in social settings interact by creating socially constructed
realities that, while resisting investigation, are an important part of the
fabric of man's relation to organization.
As an applied discipline, OD may want to concern itself with ways of
improving the sense making abilities of organizational actors. Finally, not
only system actors, but OD practitioners engage in myth making. Often these
myths belittle the political side of the organization, leaving practitioners
vulnerable to rejection, cooptation, and explusion. The politics of OD often
involves myth making as a survival and coping strategy. The fact that our
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beliefs guide our actions is no myth. Clearly, OD's dialectic is the "human-
ization" of reified structures that people accept as fate.
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Table 1 Examples of Myths Used by OP Practitioners and Organizational Actors
Myth
Categories
Myths Cited By
Practitioners
Myths Attributed To
Organizational Actors
1. Myths that
create, maintain,
and legitimize past,
present, or future
A's and C's.
2
. Myths that main-
tain and conceal
political interests
and value systems.
What I do is based on the new-
est technique for facilitating
change. (Margulies, 19 72)
My programs are more nonre-
searchable than other social
phenomena. (Margulies, 1972;
Vaill, 1974).
Your participation and sup-
port of this change will
bring about increased
performance. (King, 1974;
Margulies, 19 72)
The belief that people can
grow and develop in terms
of personal and organizational
competency tends to provide
this result. (French & Bell,
19 73)
a. Truth and love avoid the
problem of power and the
politics of change.
(Bennis, 1969)
b. Changing information flows
and access is not a political
process. (Pettigrew, 1975)
c. Selection of the intervention
strategy is the value free
result of a client need
diagnosis. (Huse, 1975)
a. Stories of all kinds
that help establish
and perpetuate cor-
porate traditions.
(Mitroff & Kilmann,
1976)
b. Admission to the
school itself con-
fers elite status
and legitimacy.
(Turner, 1961;
Kamens, 1977)
c. The charismatic up-
topian reformer who
pushes aside old
weak organizational
structures in favor
of the "novel" image
he seeks to create.
(Clark, 1972;
Pettigrew, 1976)
d. Your acceptance and
support of the
National Institute
of Education will
facilitate its
creation (Sproull
& Weiner, 19 76)
a. Organizations use be-
havioral scientists to
"reduce" their control
over subordinates.
(Baritz, 1960)
b. Blaming the victims
for their misfortunes
rather than actual
system inequities.
(Ryan, 1972)
c. Security requires
decisions made in
secret to improve
their quality.
(Pfeffer, 1977)

Table 1 continued;
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3. Myths that help
explain and even
create cause and
effect relation-
ships under condi-
tions of incom-
plete knowledge.
Organizations are ice cubes to
be unfrozen, changed, and
refrozen. (Boje & Rowland,
1977)
Consensus decision making
always is the best way to
obtain the most effective
decisions. (Bartunek, per-
sonal communication, 1977)
a. Myth of the stable
state of social
systems. (Schon,
1975)
b
.
Myth of the system-
wide equilbrium.
(Deutsch, 1963)
c. Authority is a
gravity flow
descending like
water from above.
(Miller, 1955;
Barnard, 1938)
Acceptance of
authority denies
participation in
the decision making
process and is
inimical to self-
actualization? or-
ganizations stifle
man's highest
drives.
(Simon, 1976)
4. Myths that ration-
alize away comple-
xity and turbulence
to allow sense mak-
ing and predictable
action taking.
a. Organizations are an identi-
fiable realities that can be
measured, analyzed, and
changed, (Greenfield, 1973)
b
.
The actions I take are the
result of rational scien-
tific principles. (Mar-
gulies, 1972) (This also
fits in category #1.)
Knowledge of rules
lets one predict
how others will act.
(Harris, 1974)
We attend to the
class of events that
relate to the ethical
code. (Emery & Trist,
1965)
OD interventions are guided
by data feedback and other
value-free diagnostic tech-
niques .(French & Bell, 1973)
There are no random
actions and all actions
and consequences are the
result of intentions.
(March & Olsen, 1976;
Weick, 1977)
Our decisions are the
result of reflective
systematic planning.
(Mintzberg, 1975)
Decisions are made on
the basis of data gather-
ed through formal infor-
mation systems. (Mintz-
berg, 1975)
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Footnotes
The references to force field theory are ours.
2
While we by no means imply that sense making is involved in every OD
intervention, we feel that many interventions are concerned with helping
system actors to make better or often alternative sense of their experience.
3
See Boje and Rowland (1977) for a more complete discussion of these
foundations.
4 . .Blimes has elaborated on the matter of probabilities by describing
what he calls "unpatterned events" and "patterns with few events." Unpatterned
events are a departure from equiprobability where events which occur, say 80
percent of the time, have no particular connection to other events. The event
itself is highly predictable, but the system itself has no patterning, although
actors often infer causal links. Patterns with few events are defined as:
other things being equal, the fewer the number of events, the higher the prob-
ability of occurrence of any particular event (e.g., flipping a coin has two
equiprobable events, throwing a die has six equiprobable events).
An important point to add here is that myths shed and gain meaning in
response to unanticipated consequences and stumbling blocks which must be
accommodated. The dialectic process here is roughly analogous to the evo-
ultion and revolution in paradigm development described by Kuhn (1962).
What distinguishes these myths from those described in the next section
is that these myths deal with the implied concreteness and connectedness of
social systems, while those in the next section deal with the use of myths as
rationalizers to define away randomness and unintended consequences. The two,
admittedly, are highly interrelated and we proceed under that assumption.
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Data feedback is another commonly advocated intervention that attempts
in part to give actors a better image of how other people are viewing siuta-
tions and then working through those differences.
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